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PREFACE
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruc-
tion (BTWC) opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on
26 March 1975. As of 15 November 2011, there are 165 states parties, 12 sig-
natory states, and 19 states that have neither signed nor acceded to the BTWC.
Previous review conferences were held in 1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001-2002,
and 2006. The States party to the BTWC will convene in Geneva for the 7th
Review Conference between 5-22 December 2011.1
The meeting comes at an important junction for the prevention of biological
weapons (BW) in general and the BTWC in particular. The BTWC lacks verifi-
cation provisions and an intergovernmental implementation organisation to
oversee and enforce compliance. Most policy makers, disarmament experts and
commentators therefore regard the agreement as weak. The entry into force of
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997 added to this percep-
tion: the CWC is the most complete disarmament treaty to date. It includes
extensive verification measures and created an international body, the Organi-
sation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The
Hague. Notwithstanding the many efforts almost from the day the negotiations
ended in 1971, states have attempted to equip the BTWC with verification tools.
The most recent attempt, an Ad Hoc Group of States Parties (AHG) negotiating
a legally binding protocol to the convention that, among other things, would
have added verification procedures and an international treaty implementation
organisation, failed in the summer of 2001. Its fallout at the 5th Review Con-
ference in December almost brought the entire BTWC edifice down.
Most diplomats and observers held the United States responsible for this break-
down, even though many countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were
equally unwilling to accept the draft protocol text, but conveniently switched
position to heap all blame onto Washington. Goal-focussed multilateral diplo-
macy requires compromises from all participants. However, members of the
then still young George W. Bush Administration held deep convictions about US
exceptionalism. Combined with their strongly felt sense of the country’s unique
power status after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they rejected multilateralism
as a national security strategy. The 9/11 and anthrax attacks, which came after
the scuttling of the AHG negotiations, further individualised threat perceptions
and strengthened calls for concrete and immediately actionable policy measures
1. BTWC Implementation Support Unit, latest updates available at URL <http://www.unog.ch/
80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/7BE6CBBEA0477B52C12571860035FD5C?OpenDocument>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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rather than prolonged multi-nation palavers in a faraway city. The widespread
anger towards this ideology-driven, unilateralist neo-conservative intervention,
however, remained mostly oblivious to accelerating changes in the life sciences
and their implications for the future of the BTWC in general and options for
verification in particular. After all, the verification dimension of the AHG man-
date rested on the conclusions concerning possible verification measures
reached in 1993 (and adopted by a Special Conference of the States Parties in
1994) by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine
Potential Verification Measures From a Scientific and Technical Standpoint
(VEREX). A more or less implicit assumption held by virtually all diplomats and
experts was that the future BTWC was to be modelled after the then just nego-
tiated CWC with its purely intergovernmental OPCW. During the 1990s and
early 2000s, expectations from disarmament and arms control in general too
were evolving in line with the emphasis on human security. Stakeholders other
than governments came to play a much more prominent role in policy shaping
and implementation with respect to controlling weaponry. Interestingly enough,
the human security agenda also focussed on immediate threats individualised to
local communities, and on straightaway actionable measures. The civil society
driven negotiations for ban on anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions
too displayed impatience with achieving fully-fledged verification measures and
implementation body.
The scientific, technological, political and procedural challenges to the conven-
tion are manifold and complex, and the BTWC may be the first disarmament
treaty in which they have to be addressed simultaneously. Paradoxically, the
institutional deficit and verification insufficiency may place the BTWC in a bet-
ter position to meet future challenges, provided parties can agree on common
expectations from the convention and, based on them, decide on strategies on
how to organise the future governance of the security regime. A series of annual
meetings on specific topics between the 5th and 6th Review Conferences and the
6th and 7th Review Conferences – also known as the ‘intersessional process’ –
both drew the attention to several national implementation matters that had
mostly languished since entry into force of the BTWC and attracted the partici-
pation of different types of stakeholders. These now include representatives of
the scientific and biosafety and -security communities, as well as of several inter-
national organisations whose remit touches upon the life sciences and their
applications.
The present collection of articles follows from a one-day seminar The Biological
Weapons Convention, Biosecurity and the Industry organised by the Belgian
Foreign Ministry in Brussels on 20 June 2011. Among the attendants were Bel-
gian and European representatives from the life sciences, the biosafety and -secu-SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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rity community, and the pharmaceutical industry, as well as Belgian Govern-
ment officials involved with disarmament. Ambassador Paul van den IJssel,
President-Designate of the 7th BTWC Review Conference, closed the proceed-
ings. One of the seminar’s central themes was to investigate how the life sciences
industry – one core stakeholder remaining wholly in the background of the dis-
cussions on the future of the BTWC – could become more involved. Speakers
from the aforementioned communities zoomed in on industrial standards for
biosafety and biosecurity being developed for laboratories in research and
industry facilities as a possible point of entry. In follow up to the seminar, the
idea arose to explore this lesser-known opportunity in more detail and highlight
its possibilities and limitations from three different perspectives: biorisk man-
agement, industry practice and government responsibility in formal disarma-
ment. The Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations Egmont agreed to
publish the contributions in its Egmont Papers series in collaboration with the
European Union Institute for Security Studies.
In the opening chapter, Ambassador Paul van den IJssel of the Netherlands,
describes the various obligations in the BTWC and its current status. He then
sketches the growing role of non-governmental stakeholders in the BTWC proc-
ess since its entry into force, and concludes by outlining concrete actions and his
ambitions as President-Designate of the forthcoming Review Conference to
ensure continued multi-stakeholdership in the convention in general and grow-
ing involvement of the biotechnology industries in particular.
The second chapter by Ursula Jenal and Philippe Stroot describes the status of
biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk management worldwide and analyses how
effective biorisk management in institutions can address certain aspects of the
dual-use dilemma relating to preventing biological weapons. Developed with
the support of the life science community, the biorisk management approach
contributes to the objectives of international organisations to respond to natural
or deliberate biological threats to public health and the environment. Therefore,
they argue, the BTWC States Parties should not only be encouraged to take a
more active part in ensuring the further development of biosafety, biosecurity
and biorisk management, but also to actively promote relevant non-state actor
programs. Gary Burns and Toon De Kesel build on the previous chapter and
describe the kinds of industry standards that can contribute to the objectives of
the BTWC, particularly in the absence of formal verification mechanisms. They
also offer insight into the process of creating and ameliorating standards and
suggest ways on how both their content and practice across the sector of bio-
technologies industry could be modified to meet the ambitions of the BTWC
States Parties. Frank Meeussen and Dirk Dons complete the triptych by explor-
ing the complementary and supportive role that industrial management stand-SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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ards can play. The authors argue that such standards cannot substitute for a
governmental compliance regime, but would nonetheless be useful in assisting
States Parties to fully implement their obligations under the BTWC. They see
merit in a dialogue on their further development and implementation, between,
on the one hand, States Parties and, on the other hand, biosafety associations,
the life sciences industry and international standards organisations, to be pro-
moted as a topic in the new intersessional process starting in 2012.
In the final chapter, Jean Pascal Zanders challenges the widespread idea that the
BTWC is inherently unverifiable. Many new tools for monitoring and reporting
have emerged since the early 1970s, and stakeholders other than states can and
have started playing a significant role in the development of the treaty regime.
However, as many new players emerge and bring their own instruments and
practices to the goal of BW prevention, new questions arise about the emerging
governance system and their interaction with States Parties.
Presently, no consensus on the future governance model exists, and finding com-
mon ground among different political systems and civic traditions may prove
the most difficult of all problems. Yet, for all its shortcomings today, the
approach of multi-stakeholdership with shared responsibilities by state and
non-state actors has the potential to transform the BTWC into the first truly
21st century disarmament treaty.
JEAN PASCAL ZANDERS11
STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORK OF 
THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
PAUL VAN DEN IJSSEL
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruc-
tion, more commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC), was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. Upon entering into force
on 26 March 1975, it was the first treaty ever to ban completely a whole cate-
gory of weapons. Together with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BTWC forms one of the
pillars through which the international community deals with weapons of mass
destruction.
These treaties all entail several obligations. In case of the BTWC they include:
• To never, under any circumstance, develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise
acquire or retain microbial or biological agents or toxins that have no justi-
fication for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; or the wea-
pons, equipment or means of delivery to use them for hostile purposes or in
armed conflict (Article I);
• To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated
resources prior to joining (Article II);
• Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to
acquire or retain biological weapons (Article III);
• To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the
BTWC domestically (Article IV);
• To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the
implementation of the BTWC (Article V);
• To comply and cooperate with UN Security Council decisions regarding
alleged breaches of the BTWC (while also getting the right to request such an
investigation) (Article VI);
• To assist States that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of
the BTWC (Article VII); and
• To facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the exchange of scientific
and technological information for peaceful purposes (Article X).SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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Through the process of review conferences States Parties have undertaken a
range of further commitments regarding the BTWC’s implementation. They
include:
• Designating national contact points;
• Providing information to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU – see below
for further discussion) on how they implement their obligations.
• Annually submitting Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) reports;
• Indicating whether they require implementation assistance or can offer
implementation assistance to other States Parties; and
• Promoting the universalisation of the Convention.
While states ratify the BTWC and the responsibility for complying with the pro-
visions and additional obligations lies with national governments, the network
of actors active in the fields covered by the BTWC is much broader. After all,
governments only carry out a part of all research into biotechnology and related
fields. The same goes for the manufacture of products that incorporate new
biotechnologies, such as new medicines, but also detergents or biomaterials. The
biotechnology industry and academic field drive the current ground-breaking
developments across the globe.
These developments have the potential to improve the lives of millions of people
and should therefore be encouraged. At the same time, they also bring new risks
as they might be abused by those willing to inflict mass harm against humans,
animals and plants. Dangerous pathogens being researched or manipulated in
laboratories could also be accidentally released into the environment. Because
the life sciences and their industrial applications offer opportunities and pose
inherent dangers, it is imperative that the stakeholders in industry and academia
are brought into the BTWC discussions. As will be discussed below, this is
already happening, but as President-designate I will, together with the ISU,
endeavour to involve both industry and the academic field in the upcoming
Review Conference even more. I furthermore hope that we can find ways to
sustain that engagement after the Review Conference as well.
The history of stakeholder engagement
Although the BTWC in Article XII indicates that only one review conference
was required, the State Parties already decided at 1st Review Conference that a
second one was needed. Thus a tradition of holding review conferences roughly
once every five years was established, which has deepened the application and
broadened the scope of the original text, as to better address the developments
in the fields covered by the BTWC.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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In order to do so, the early review conferences developed some instruments that
gave the State Parties better ways to deal with doubts about compliance by other
states. Examples are the Formal Consultative Process and the CBMs that were
established by the 2nd Review Conference in 1986. The CBMs, whose format
was crafted by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts in 1987,
are designed to facilitate an annual information exchange between the State Par-
ties on activities within their borders relevant to the BTWC. They can include
details of facilities and activities run by the private sector and academia. They
were developed, as the Final Document of the 2nd Review Conference states, ‘to
prevent or reduce the occurrence of doubts or suspicions, and in order to
improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (bio-
logical) activities.’
The 3rd Review Conference in 1991 expanded the areas covered by the CBMs.
The participating State Parties also decided to address the verification issue by
establishing a group of governmental experts (VEREX) to explore ways to
develop potential verification measures. A Special Conference called in 1994 to
discuss VEREX’s findings led to the creation of the Ad Hoc Group of State
Parties (AHG) that was to negotiate a legally-binding verification regime to the
BTWC. The 4th Review Conference in 1996 set 2001 as deadline for the AHG
to finish its work. Due to fundamental differences of opinion the AHG could
not agree on a final document before the 5th Review Conference in 2001. Dur-
ing this process various stakeholder groups became interested in the work of the
BTWC and began to brief states in the margins of meetings.
At the 5th Review Conference itself, the AHG mandate too became contentious,
which led to a suspension of the conference until 2002. After the hiatus, an
intersessional process with annual Meetings of State Parties prepared by Meet-
ings of Experts was set up to discuss matters of national implementation and
certain more technical issues. The process laid the foundations for a substantive
and productive 6th Review Conference in 2006, which, as a result, decided on
a second series of intersessional meetings between the 6th and 7th Review Con-
ferences.
In these past years we have therefore regularly had the opportunity to sit down
with each other and discuss matters concerning the BTWC. The Meetings of
Experts, in which industry representatives also participated, discussed many of
the more technical issues. Increasingly these meetings are used to gather input
from experts from outside of government institutions. They have provided a
structured channel for direct contributions from stakeholders and have been
instrumental in developing the sense of community that now exists amongst
those supporting the work of the Convention. The results of these discussionsSETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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fed into the Meetings of States Parties. This closer cooperation between the var-
ious stakeholders in the BTWC is, in my opinion, a very positive result that I
hope will continue after the 7th Review Conference.
Opportunities to participate in the work of the Convention
Expert-based discussions under the BTWC have become more open and their
results are increasingly being incorporated into the governmental review proc-
esses. Furthermore, there are several ways in which experts can participate more
directly in that process. One possibility is that individual non-governmental
experts, either from industry of academia, are included in national delegations
to the Review Conference or other BTWC meetings by their governments. That
is, of course, the prerogative of national governments.
Sometimes, the chair of the conference can decide to invite an expert as Guest
of the Meeting. Since my appointment as ambassador in Geneva, and especially
in the last year while preparing for the Review Conference, I have met many
experts with deep knowledge of many of the topics that will be on the table
coming December and I would welcome their participation. I am currently look-
ing at possibilities to invite a number of them. For example, I have already
invited two leading scientists from academia to brief the conference and am in
the process of setting up a panel discussion for industry representatives.
Interested groups from industry and academia can also participate in their own
right. Both international and non-governmental groups can register for the
review conference and for other BTWC meetings. Although they may not be
part to some of the more sensitive discussions, or permitted to participate in
decision making processes, there are still numerous ways for them to influence
the outcomes of meetings of the Convention.
I also intend to hold a poster and display session during the first week of the
conference to provide time for participants to mingle and, for those wishing to
do so, showcase specific work, products or views. This will highlight the diver-
sity and strength of the stakeholder community that underpins the work of the
BTWC.
Another popular way to share knowledge and views are side events. Held most
often between the morning and afternoon sessions, side events enable the organ-
iser to expand much more on a specific topic of interest than he or she would be
able to do during a time-restricted presentation in one of the formal sessions. A
side event can also take the form of a panel discussion with experts from variousSETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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backgrounds discussing any topic related to the BTWC. As of October, three
side events are planned to address links with industry and five to examine the
implications of advances in life science and technology.
The above mentioned opportunities for participation and contribution all relate
to the Review Conference and require one’s presence in Geneva at that time.
However, there are also opportunities to participate in the BTWC review proc-
ess without being present at the Review Conference and outside of that specific
time frame. For example, industry, both as a group or on the level of individual
companies (or even as an individual), can engage relevant office holders, both
national and international. Such engagement can be used to either inform the
office holders, or enter into discussion with them.
Another very good way to contribute to the debate on the Review Conference
and the topics on its agenda is the so-called ‘Think Zone’ of the ISU. The Think
Zone is a website to which anyone can submit papers on a topic relevant to the
BTWC. This Think Zone is maintained by the ISU, which was established at the
6th Review Conference.1 The ISU consists of experts on content as well as pro-
cedural matters relating to the BTWC. They will be able to point you in the right
direction with any issue related to the BTWC.
The 7th Review Conference and the future of 
the Convention
In preparation of the Review Conference many countries and organisations
organised meetings and seminars to discuss matters requiring decision in
December. In my capacity as president-designate I participated in several of
them, and also undertook a number of bilateral consultations. Based on the
information I received in these seminars and meetings, I expect that besides the
formal review process, the following seven topics will receive much attention
from the State Parties coming December (presented in no particular oder):
• The future of the intersessional process.
• Cooperation and assistance: how to improve how states work together in the
development of peaceful uses of new technologies?
• The Confidence Building Measures: how can they be adapted to deal with
new scientific and technological developments, and how can we improve
states’ CBM response rate, while, if possible, avoiding that they are overly
burdensome?
1. The Think Zone can be found on <www.unog.ch/bwc/thinkzone>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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• Science and technology: what do relevant advances in this field mean for the
BTWC?
• The ISU: will its mandate that ends in December be renewed, and what will
be its future task and composition?
• Compliance and verification: how to build confidence others are living up to
their obligations? and
• Universalisation: the BTWC has (as of 1 November 2011) 165 States Parties.
There remain twelve states that have signed but not ratified the treaty and
another nineteen that are currently not party to it. In my capacity as presi-
dent-designate I have therefore undertaken, both bilaterally and together
with the depository states, efforts to encourage non-members to accede or
ratify their signature. I have good hope that this will lead to the accession of
new members in the near future.
I should stress that this list is in no way meant to be conclusive, nor is it designed
to keep certain items off the agenda. As chair I welcome discussion on any topic
that State Parties feel is relevant to the BTWC, and I will do my utmost to chair
the debate in such a way that all opinions are heard.
It will be the State Parties that make the decisions at the Review Conference on
how to deal with all the issues laid out above and they will be in the driver’s seat
of the subsequent intersessional process. As noted earlier, they are not the only
stakeholders. Industry and academia are also involved, first, because they are
responsible for a large part of all relevant research and developments in the
areas covered by the BTWC, and, second, because they play an important role
in implementing the procedures and practices put in place to ensure relevant life
science capacity is used solely for beneficial purposes.
Therefore, states, industry, and academia, have a shared interest in ensuring that
bioscience is used and applied in a responsible manner. They are the ones with
first-hand knowledge of their own facilities and structures. Direct involvement
of industry and academia can be beneficial to the States Parties when they design
new measures to ensure the world stays free of biological weapons.
All in all, I believe the only way forward to strengthen the BTWC regime is with
all stakeholders on board. I believe much progress has already been made. I
hope we can make another significant step coming December and I am very
much looking forward to meeting you there.17
DEVELOPING BIOSECURITY: ADDRESSING THE DUAL-
USE PROBLEM FROM AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
URSULA JENAL & PHILIPPE STROOT1
Introduction
Biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk management aim at protecting the human
community and the environment by promoting and implementing measures for
the safe and secure use of hazardous or potentially hazardous biological mate-
rials. In this context, biosafety professionals play a key role in the management
of biological risks in their organisations, as well as in the transfer of knowledge
to other institutions and countries.
The terms ‘biosafety’ and ‘biosecurity’ are used in accordance with the Labora-
tory Biosafety Manual and the Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance published by
the World Health Organisation (WHO).2 Biosafety refers to biological contain-
ment measures, operational procedures and management practices aimed at pre-
venting unintentional exposure of staff to hazardous or potentially hazardous
biological agents and materials in laboratories and other facilities, or at preclud-
ing their release into the environment. Biosecurity covers the security measures
designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of
valuable biological materials, including pathogens and toxins. It also includes
the protection of containment facilities from sabotage or other wrongdoing.
To cover the whole spectrum of biological risks to laboratory workers, society
and the environment (Figure 1, p. 18), biosecurity has become increasingly inte-
grated into biosafety to make up the more current approach of ‘biorisk manage-
ment’. Biorisk management implements technical, behavioural and management
measures based on risk assessment. In 2008, the European Normalisation Cen-
tre (CEN) issued the Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard, also referred to
as CWA 15793:2008.3 In addition to specifying the modalities to implement
biosafety and biosecurity control measures, the document also addresses their
1. An expanded version of this contribution was published in Philippe Stroot and Ursula Jenal, ‘A New
Approach: Contributing to BWC Compliance via Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Biorisk Management’, Non-
proliferation Review, Special Issue: ‘Global Perspectives on Re-envisioning the Biological Weapons Con-
vention’, vol. 18, no. 3 (November 2011), available from URL <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/18-3.htm>.
2. WHO, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, Third Edition, 2004; and WHO, Biorisk Management: Labora-
tory Biosecurity Guidance, WHO/CDS/EPR/2006.6, 2006.
3. European Normalisation Centre (CEN), Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard, CWA 15793:
2008.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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oversight and review, as well as the appropriate allocation of responsibilities and
resources by using a management system approach.4
Biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk management have become an increasingly sig-
nificant part of global public health as there is a growing demand for enhanced
national and regional laboratory capacity. The WHO’s International Health
Regulations (IHR), a legally-binding international agreement, seek to prevent,
control, protect against the international spread of disease and provide a public
health response to outbreaks.5 This also requires countries and regions to
develop core surveillance and reporting capacities, which involves expanding
the implementation of biosafety and biorisk management programmes.6
In addition to the worldwide establishment of local diagnostic and public health
response capabilities, as required by the IHR, the huge development of biomed-
ical activities in the academic, public and private sectors has lead to a rapidly
expanding bio-containment capacity in most parts of the world. According to
open sources, the global number of biosafety level (BSL) 4 laboratories – the
highest containment level – exceeded 50 at the end of 2010.7 Although a few of
them have been declared not to operate at BSL-4, construction of some new
installations is in the planning phase. Many more facilities function at the sec-
ond highest containment level, BSL-3. Extrapolation from figures published in
Figure 1: Biological risk spectrum
4. The management system approach used in CWA 15793:2008 is similar to the approach of manage-
ment standards developed by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), as ISO 9001:2008
(<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_9000_essentials>) or ISO 14001:2004 (<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_
essentials>). CEN Workshop Agreements (CWAs) are peer-established and consensus-based specifications
drawn up in an open workshop according to specific procedures; their application is voluntary and not
limited to CEN Member States. ISO Standards are developed by experts mandated by national standardi-
sation bodies. Their application too is voluntary, but they enjoy wider recognition.
5. WHO, International Health Regulations, Second Edition, 2005.
6. Nicoletta Previsani, ‘Biosafety and Biosecurity in Laboratories’, lecture delivered to the Second Global
Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres, Paris, 21-23 June 2010, available
from URL <http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D7760.PDF>.
7. Philippe Stroot, ‘Overview of Dual Use Control at International and Institutional Levels’, lecture deliv-
ered to the Third International Symposium Biosecurity and Biosafety: Future Trends and Solutions,
Milano, 13-15 October 2010, available from URL <http://www.bioemergency.eu/pdf/01Stroot.pdf>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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the UK, Belgium and Switzerland yields a rough estimate of more than 2,000
BSL-3 facilities in Europe.8 Their number in North America is at the least likely
to be of a similar order of magnitude. Other parts of the world are home to
fewer BSL-3 installations, but their totals are increasing, particularly in growth
and developing countries.
The nexus biological weapons – biorisk management
Biological weapons exploit infectivity to harm humans, animals and plants.
Used against humans, pathogens range from the highly lethal to the incapacitat-
ing. Anti-animal and anti-plant agents seek to severely damage agricultural out-
put and cause economic harm. Even though the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) bans biological weapons (BW), there has been growing
international concern that advancements in molecular biology techniques and
genetic engineering, applied in e.g. synthetic biology or nanobiotechnology,
could potentially rekindle military interest in BW. Consequently, biological
materials resulting from new research techniques and production processes may
not be listed among select highly pathogenic microorganisms. Furthermore,
even though developing such weapons does require qualified scientists using
sophisticated equipment and techniques, it does not necessarily require high
containment facilities. In addition, the threat may also arise from the use of
basic microbiology techniques, as demonstrated by Salmonella attacks against
food bars in the USA in 1984.9 Therefore, limiting control to a finite list of
agents and high containment facilities only addresses part of the threat spec-
trum, but misses certain dimensions of preventing the misuse of biological
agents and techniques. Yet, due to the explosion of biological activities world-
wide, extending top-down controls to all potentially concerned activities and
facilities may prove impossible or not cost-effective.
Fear of misuse of the life sciences lives primarily among members of the disar-
mament and non-proliferation communities, security experts and policy mak-
8. House of Commons, Pre-appointment hearing with the Chair-elect of the Biotechnology and Biological
Sciences Research Council, Professor Sir Tom Blundell, Innovation, Universities, Sciences and Skills Com-
mittee, Sixth Report, 19 May 2009, available from URL <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200809/cmselect/cmdius/506/506.pdf>; Institut Scientifique de Santé Publique (WIV-ISP), Les Installa-
tions de Haut Niveau de Confinement en Belgique. Rapport. Période 1995-2008, Brussels, 2009, availa-
ble from URL <http://www.biosafety.be/CU/PDF/Rapport_ISP_FR_D_2009_2505_40.pdf>; and Ecogen,
Contained Systems: Public Register, portal run by the Swiss Federal Coordination Centre for Biotechnol-
ogy, available from URL <http://www.ecogen.ch/ecogen/Forms/Register/RegisterSearch.aspx>.
9. Jonathan E. Suk, Anna Zmorzynska, Iris Hunger, et al., ‘Dual-use Research and Technological Diffu-
sion: Reconsidering the Bioterrorism Threat Spectrum’, PLOS Pathogens, vol. 7, no. 1 (January 2011),
available from URL
<http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1001253>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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ers. Scientists tend to view nature as by far the gravest of all biological threats
and negligence and accidents tend to generate much greater concern than hypo-
thetical scenarios of terrorism and crime. European experts in the life sciences
from both academia and industry do not consider potential threats related to
weapon development among the main biological threats, reflecting their higher
concern about the natural dimensions of the biorisk threat spectrum.10
The BTWC was negotiated during the Cold War when nuclear weapons were
the primary determinant of the balance of power and governments controlled
and steered the armament dynamic. Consequently, the convention was deprived
of tools to verify and enforce compliance. The obligation to transpose the inter-
national prohibitions into domestic legislation was also wanting.11 Today, with
the rise of the life sciences and the biotechnology industry, the challenge of the
BTWC to install substantive mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance, as
well as to setup and oversee its implementation at national level is somewhat
linked to the difficulty for States Parties to monitor biological risks at the level
of institutions through their own regulatory and oversight capacity. This issue
has acquired even more saliency with the shift of the overall threat perception
from the misuse of biological agents and toxins in state-run activities to terrorist
actions.
Although their activities could theoretically lead to novel BW, the vast majority
of life science institutions, be it academia or industry, work in an open, honest
and responsible manner. Therefore, they could view intrusive verification proc-
esses or control mechanisms as unjustified and consider them as unwarranted
patronisation by the disarmament community. Such perceptions would most
certainly generate substantial resistance to any effort to strengthen the BTWC
in this sector. From this angle, a world of difference seems to exist between the
BTWC’s legitimate purpose to prevent any possible BW development and the
scientific community’s actual work.
Linking biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk management to 
the BTWC
For most of its lifespan, the BTWC has attempted to achieve its disarmament
and non-proliferation goals by a top-down approach. In reality, it has added
10. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Expert Forecast on Emerging Biological Risks
related to Occupational Safety and Health, European Risk Observatory Report, no. 3, Bilbao, 2007,
available from URL <http://osha.europa.eu/en/publications/reports/7606488>.
11. Jean Pascal Zanders and Amy E. Smithson, ‘Ensuring the future of the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 18, no. 3 (2011), pp. 479-87.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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little to the convention’s limited ability to ensure compliance. Even if many
countries have developed regulations that criminalise activities linked to the
development, acquisition, transfer or use of BW, they still are still at pains to
ensure comprehensive control over the security of biological agent use in labo-
ratories. In contrast, the biotechnology sector and the life sciences community
already support responsibility-based institutional biorisk management pro-
grammes, even though discrepancies exist between institutions – large corpora-
tions generally run comprehensive biorisk management programs, while the
academia, the public sector and smaller private companies show greater varia-
tions in the ways to manage biological risks – and countries. Biorisk manage-
ment, which covers biosecurity, addresses concerns about the dual-use potential
of many processes and products. Its development has followed from legal obli-
gations as well as voluntary initiatives derived from risk awareness and sense of
responsibility towards society. Biorisk management directly involves the people
who deal with biological materials and related techniques as part of their daily
activities in the relevant institutions. This bottom-up responsibility-based
approach could therefore be complemented with some kind of monitoring or
other control process run by the national authority in charge of BTWC over-
sight. Such adaptation of the biorisk management process to the BTWC goals
could serve the disarmament interests far better than standalone regulatory and
verification processes while simultaneously generating sectorial support. Such a
culture appears to offer the best protection against accidents and misuse while
allowing unimpeded scientific progress and development.12 Promoting respon-
sible, safe and secure operations in institutions is likely to strengthen the overall
level of biosecurity, promote reporting from institutions and ease the degree of
oversight required from the authorities.
The bottom-up approach should build on and strengthen ongoing international
initiatives and projects, but simultaneously prioritise some aspects relevant from
a BTWC perspective. Efforts to increase awareness about dual-use issues in the
scientific community should not be disconnected from other matters, such as
biosafety or the need to protect valuable biological materials. They should be
addressed together with other ethical questions related to biological discoveries
and biomedical advances. Raising awareness about biosafety, biosecurity and
bioethics should begin early in the curriculum of all future life science research-
ers and other professionals, i.e., before they start handling biological agents, are
about to work on sensitive materials, or have access to a containment facility.
12. WHO, Responsible Life Sciences Research for Global Health Security, Geneva, 2010, available from
URL <http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2010/WHO_HSE_GAR_BDP_2010.2_eng.pdf>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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Parallel to awareness raising, appropriate training, building of knowledge and
information transfers are needed to ensure the global development of efficient
and sustainable biorisk management. In this context, developing countries with
an identified lack of specific knowledge merit more attention. For perception
and technical reasons, training aimed at preventing misuse and enhancing biose-
curity in a more general sense should always be connected to biosafety training.
Also, given the need to guarantee safe and secure activities in different settings
and socio-economic situations, biosafety and biosecurity training should be
based on both recognised competence requirements and a flexible train-the-
trainer approach.
The necessity to reinforce the role of biosafety professionals in facilitating bio-
risk management is reflected in the new workshop agreement document
CWA16335:2011 on Biosafety Professional (BSP) competence by the European
Normalisation Centre (CEN).13
While underlining the importance of these and other private sector initiatives
and activities in promoting effective biorisk management in institutions and
their contribution to the BTWC’s objectives, their success equally depends on
their full recognition by governments and international bodies. To some extent,
national authorities could promote a global biorisk management approach that
includes biosecurity, as it is already the case for biosafety in a number of coun-
tries. During the 7th Review Conference, States Parties could, for example, for-
mally recognise the need for integrated biorisk management and the role of
standards such as CWA 15793 as a potential tool to help controlling the risk of
dual-use in institutions. In this way, the BTWC could play a significant role in
promoting their adoption across the world, while simultaneously serving its
own security goals.
Conclusion
Actions by State Parties and non-state initiatives and activities must complement
each other to achieve the goals of the BTWC. To this end, States Parties should,
on the one hand, consider actions to encourage the development of complete
regulatory frameworks that do not just focus on dual-use concerns, but also
cover the various dimensions of biological risk management – biosafety, bio-
security and bioethics – in the concerned institutions. On the other hand, they
should also recognise the need for institutions to develop sustainable biological
13. European Committee for Standardisation, ‘Biosafety Professional Competence’, CWA 16335, Septem-
ber 2011, available from URL <http://www.nen.nl/web/Normshop/Norm/CWA-163352011-en.htm>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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laboratory capacities by applying biorisk management programmes to address
all possible biological threats, natural as well as from bioterrorism, in full
respect of ethical, safety and security norms. Such recognition will not only con-
nect the BTWC to its stakeholders active in the field, but also join international
organisations and the life science community in their respective efforts to
develop a healthier and safer world.25
CAN BIORISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 
CONTRIBUTE TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?
GARY BURNS AND TOON DE KESEL
Introduction
A key objective of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) is to
prevent biological weapon (BW) proliferation. Attempts to introduce verifica-
tion tools and procedures have failed thus far and future success appears as
remote as ever. States Parties have meanwhile started up new processes to
increase compliance assurance. In particular, they are required to annually sub-
mit a variety of information on certain activities, including, for example, data
concerning national vaccine production facilities. Collectively, these require-
ments are referred to as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). While CBMs
generate information, their contribution to compliance assurance has proved to
be limited. Relatively few states return the filled-out forms. Although 2011 has
so far proved to be a record year for submissions, as of 27 October a mere 68
out of a total of 165 States have complied with their CBM obligation.1 A key
problem is that this obligation is politically rather than legally binding, and con-
sequently no sanctions can be imposed. (A legal obligation would transform the
CBMs into formal ‘reports’ and constitute the baseline data for a verification
system.) Furthermore, the submitted CBM data are not subject to independent
review. Finally, they are not translated into all six (or even one of the more
commonly used) official United Nations languages and consequently only the
largest states with sufficient resources have the capacity to study them all. These
and other factors limit their utility for most states, and thus further reduce the
incentives to participate in the process. The information in the CBMs is confi-
dential and only if a state decides to publish its own returns can the submission
be independently scrutinised.
In the absence of formal verification processes and limited utility of the CBMs,
it is timely to look at other ways to build confidence in compliance. In 2008, a
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) Workshop on the management
of biosafety and biosecurity resulted in the publication of CEN Workshop
1. Data available from the BTWC Implementation Support Unit, at URL <http://www.unog.ch/__
80256ee600585943.nsf/%28httpPages%29/4fa4da37a55c7966c12575780055d9e8?OpenDocu-
ment&ExpandSection=25#_Section25>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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Agreement (CWA) 15793 ‘Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard’. Work-
shop participants included representatives from 24 countries in North and
South America, Europe, and Asia. In addition, CWA 16335 addresses the broad
range of competences and abilities required by individuals who advise manage-
ment and personnel on the safe and secure use of biological material. They also
oversee and support the development and implementation of relevant manage-
ment programmes or systems. The availability of standards of this type suggests
another path to support existing approaches to building confidence in compli-
ance.
Management Systems
Management systems are widely used by many organisations to improve their
effectiveness and efficiency. Example are standards published by the Interna-
tional Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), such as the ISO 9000 family on
quality management systems and ISO 14001, which addresses environmental
management systems. ISO standards generally originate through the communi-
cation of a need by an industry sector to a national standards body. As an ISO
member, this national organisation then proposes the new work item to the ISO
as a whole. If the need is recognised and formally agreed, the subsequent process
begins with the definition of the technical scope, which is usually undertaken by
working groups comprised of technical experts from countries interested in the
subject matter. Once agreement has been reached on the scope, countries nego-
tiate detailed specifications through a consensus-building phase with the final
phase being formal approval of the resulting draft International Standard in
accordance with stipulated acceptance criteria. If agreed, the text is published as
an ISO International Standard.
OHSAS (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series) 18001, is an inter-
national standard addressing occupational health and safety, that was created
via a concerted effort from a number of the world’s leading national standards
and certification bodies, and specialist consultancies.
A key element of effective management systems in general is the concept of con-
tinual improvement through a cycle of planning, implementing, reviewing and
improving processes undertaken to achieve its goals. This is often referred to as
the ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act principle’. The essential elements of each stage are:
• Plan: including identification of hazard and risk and establishment of goals;
• Implement: including training and operational issues;
• Check: measure/monitor performance against the objectives; and
• Act: on the basis of review to make necessary changes.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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CWA 15793: 2008
Several standards addressing health and safety matters already existed when the
development of a biorisk management standard was first considered, but in
some cases they were perceived as very prescriptive or lacking in relevant detail
when they concerned hazardous biological materials. A number of organisa-
tions, including ones representing biosafety and biosecurity professionals,
viewed as desirable an international performance-oriented standard that
addresses both biosafety and biosecurity. Several options towards this goal were
available, such as the development of an ANSI (American National Standards
Institute), EN (European) or ISO Standard. Ultimately, the CWA process was
selected for several reasons, including relatively low cost, a comparatively short
time frame for its development, and the potential to build on the basis of an
international consensus. (See Graph on p. 28)
While the document integrates biosafety and biosecurity under a common all
hazards approach known as ‘biorisk’, biosecurity is specifically addressed in
several areas including policies and management controls, definition and
approval of projects, selection and vetting of workers, control of sensitive infor-
mation, control of inventories and general security controls.
Benefits for organisations complying with CWA 15793
The most obvious benefit for organisations implementing CWA 15793 include
improved biosafety and biosecurity performance ensuring protection for
employees and the wider community, as well as preventing loss, theft, and mis-
use of biological materials with dual use potential. Compliance with the stand-
ard furthermore avoids direct financial costs associated with business interrup-
tion, ensures conformity with legal requirements and helps to avert penalties or
litigation. An additional, yet significant benefit concerns the preservation of an
organisation’s reputation.
An organisation that obtained formal certification as meeting the requirements
of the CWA may be able to negotiate lower insurance premiums and reduce the
number of interventions by regulators. Conformity also helps to promote the
exchange of materials and expansion of research collaboration, as the CWA
assures that receiving/collaborating organisations can handle hazardous materi-
als safely and securely. It also improves prospects when bidding for contracts or
research funding. AstraZeneca, a global private sector bio-pharmaceutical com-
pany, is a case in point. Its Code of Conduct includes a statement that the com-SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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pany is ‘committed to working only with contractors, such as suppliers, joint
venture or co-promotion partners and research or licensing partners, who
embrace standards of ethical behaviours that are consistent with our own’.2 To
facilitate external interactions involving hazardous biological materials, Astra-
Zeneca developed a guideline for external biorisk compliance, which explicitly
recognises the value of the CWA: ‘Current certification by accredited bodies that
organisations comply with CWA 15793:2008 may be taken as satisfactory evi-
dence of suitable standards’.3
CWA 16335:2011
For adequate laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, the main pillars are a biorisk
programme and the availability of a person – a biosafety professional – with
appropriate skills to develop and manage such a programme. To this end CWA
16335:2011 on ‘Biosafety Professional (BSP) Competence’ was developed with
international participation, including the American Biological Safety Associa-
tion (ABSA), the UK-based Institute of Safety in Technology and Research
(ISTR), and the European Biosafety Association (EBSA). It describes the profile
and tasks of a biosafety professional in an organisation and provides model
training specifications that help define individual competence. CWA
15793:2008 recognises a key role for the biosafety professional in a biorisk
management programme, but defines it only in general terms. CWA 16335 thus
goes further by clearly describing competences of such a professional.
Compliance with the BTWC
As others have noted elsewhere, there are two aspects to compliance, namely
(1) compliance with the prohibitions of the convention, i.e. not engaging in pro-
scribed activities; and (2) compliance with the positive obligations of the con-
vention, i.e. implementing the necessary measures to reduce the likelihood of
prohibited activities taking place.4
There are several routes towards full compliance. The most important tool con-
sists of legislation transposing the international requirements of the BTWC and
2. AstraZeneca Code of Conduct, p. 4, available from URL <http://www.astrazeneca.com/Responsibility/
Code-policies-standards/Code-of-Conduct>.
3. ‘GMMs, Pathogens and Toxins - Guidelines for External Compliance Assurance’, Internal AstraZeneca
company document.
4. See for example: Richard Lennane, ‘Verification for the BTWC: if not the protocol, then what?’, Disar-
mament Forum, no. 1 (2011), pp. 39-50.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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UN Security Council Resolution 1540 into the national legal system. Besides the
core prohibitions, they include criminal and penal law, and regulations imposing
conditions on specific activities. An example of the latter set of instruments are
technology transfer regulations that require government-issued licenses for the
export or transfer of specified biological materials and equipment associated
with their culture or use. According to Article III, States Parties to the BTWC
must ensure that no transfer of such materials and equipment can occur to indi-
viduals or sub-state entities who might seek to acquire biological weapons.
Examples of such restrictions are the US Public Health and Security and Bioter-
rorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 and the associated Registry of
Select Agents and Toxins, and the UK Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001.
There are a number of limitations to list-based approaches such as those indi-
cated above. For example, responding to rapidly developing technologies such
as those being applied in the area of synthetic biology, or to naturally occurring
events such as newly emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases as illustrated
in recent past by SARS, pandemic influenza virus and highly pathogenic E. coli
strains.
Several other countries have promulgated similar legislation, but unfortunately
the practice is still far from universal.
A compliance role for international standards such as 
CWA 15793?
In her address to the Annual Meeting of BTWC States Parties in Geneva on
9 December 2009, US Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher stated that ‘The
BWC should provide an international forum for advancing the dialogues on
pathogen security and laboratory biosafety practices and for promoting legisla-
tion, guidelines and standards through cooperation and partnership’. She went
on to say that ‘We must work here to develop international standards and prac-
tices for these important elements that advance our mutual security’.5
CWA 15793 represents just such a standard. The CBRN Action Plan of the
European Council published in November 2009 recognises its relevancy by
recommending that ‘Facilities possessing substances on the EU list of high risk
5. Statement by Under Secretary Tauscher on Biological Weapons, 9 December 2009, text available from
URL 
<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/December/20091210142708xjsnommis0.2277948.html>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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biological agents and toxins consider as appropriate the implementation of the
CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA 15793), WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guid-
ance or their national equivalent standards’.6 The international basis for the
development of CWA 15793, and its widespread recognition and acceptance
since its introduction, shows its potential value not just in the European Union,
but also across the world.
Certification that organisations comply with the requirements of CWA 15793
can provide an increased level of assurance that organisations in States Parties
abide by the BTWC prohibitions and obligations. Because there may be greater
concern among stakeholders over compliance with the BTWC by organisations
working in the bio-defence sector, a useful starting point might be for those
organisations to be the first to engage in this way.
To maximise its potential, international and cross-sector recognition and adop-
tion of CWA 15793 must increase still further. In addition, effective means for
accreditation and certification should be developed and made available. Some
hurdles towards achieving this goal remain but, but they are not insurmounta-
ble. For example, some voices question the appropriateness of the CWA process
to develop a health and safety standard. One way forward is to develop the
current CWA into an ISO standard. In addition, universal application of the
CWA would benefit from its translation into more languages than currently
available.
Some questions have been raised with regard to implementation difficulties that
can arise in countries with limited experience in management systems. A solu-
tion to this is at hand and publication of a related guidance document is antici-
pated for the near future.
Finally, there have been some concerns about the limited availability of compe-
tent persons to support implementation and certification. Some European coun-
tries, e.g., Germany and The Netherlands, have specific legal requirements on
the appointment of biosafety officers. In the United Kingdom and the United
States, national biosafety professional organisations already run certification
programmes to address this problem. However, until very recently an interna-
tional agreement on required qualifications has been lacking. CWA 16335:
2011 ‘Biosafety Professional Competence’, referred to earlier, addresses this
gap.
6. ‘Council conclusions on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security
in the European Union - an EU CBRN Action Plan’, Council of the European Union, Document 15505/1/
09 REV 1, 12 November 2009, p. 19, text available from URL <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/
en/09/st15/st15505-re01.en09.pdf>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
32
Conclusions
CWA 15793 has achieved wide international recognition since its adoption in
2008. It can help organisations to effectively manage risks of accidental or inten-
tional harm associated with work involving biological agents and toxins and
offers many other benefits. Successful application to disarmament and non-pro-
liferation requires broad international adoption across all sectors, including bio-
defence. Development into an ISO Standard may facilitate this. Competent per-
sons will be needed to manage the implementation programmes. An interna-
tional framework specifying competency and training requirements is now
available in addition to already existing national schemes.
Responsible behaviour by industry is a key ingredient for continuing viability of
the regime against biological weapons. In the absence of formal verification
tools, certification to an international standard such as CWA 15793 should help
build confidence by providing a clear demonstration of compliant behaviour.33
INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS AS COMPLEMENTARY TOOLS 
FOR BTWC IMPLEMENTATION
FRANK MEEUSSEN & DIRK DONS
Applying biosafety and biosecurity measures in 
implementing the BTWC
Article IV of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) commits
States Parties to ‘take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the devel-
opment, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Conven-
tion, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control
anywhere’. Governments of States Parties are thus required to develop and
enforce relevant national legislative, regulatory and oversight measures.
Through the process of intersessional meetings increased attention has been
given to the matter on the regional and global levels. Moreover, the range of
issue areas has widened and efforts have been made to adapt or include
biosafety and biosecurity regulations into the broader regime prohibiting and
preventing the misuse of biology and biotechnology for hostile purposes. To
that same end, governments can also promote education, awareness raising, or
development of scientific and professional codes of conduct.
Are there, besides these measures, other options to implement Article IV? One
area of interest concerns biosafety and biosecurity management standards devel-
oped by biosafety associations and the life sciences industry outside of the
BTWC or even outside of the governmental framework. Biosafety measures ini-
tially emerged from voluntary action, and certain aspects developed into stand-
ards now accepted by broad swaths of the relevant industry sectors. Concerns
about terrorism or criminal application, particularly after the 9/11 strikes
against New York and Washington and the anthrax letters, led to the additional
promotion of the biosecurity dimension. It may therefore be of interest to inves-
tigate how industrial management standards on biosafety and biosecurity, as
promoted by the International Organisation for Standards (ISO) or the Euro-
pean Committee for Standardisation (CEN), could contribute to the goals set
forward by the BTWC States Parties.
Well known industrial management standards are the ISO 9001 on quality man-
agement, ISO 14001 on environmental management and Occupational Health
and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS) 18001 on occupational health andSETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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safety.1 Their objective is to manage risk, create a level playing field, advance
communication and trade, and facilitate implementation of legislation. They
were developed in cooperation with national, regional and international stand-
ardisation institutes, such as the CEN and ISO, both of which are private insti-
tutions. Standards surpass declarations of intent or codes of conduct. If applica-
ble, a company’s certification of compliance with a particular standard follow-
ing an audit or inspection by an accredited conformity assessment body
guarantees the implementation of certain management practices.
The CEN develops tools known as CEN Standards and CEN Workshop Agree-
ments (CWA). With regard to biosafety and biosecurity, it issued the Laboratory
Biorisk Management Standard CWA 15793:2008 in 2008.2 This document was
designed in cooperation with key stakeholders, including the European Biolog-
ical Safety Association (EBSA) and its American counterpart (ABSA), the Asia
Pacific Biological Safety Association (APBSA), the World Health Organisation
(WHO) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV). The standard draws on existing inter-
national norms (WHO) as well as national and regional (EU) legislation. It uses
the term ‘Biorisk’ to cover both biosecurity and biosafety. The CWA
15793:2008 remains valid until 2014, when it will be reviewed.
The biorisk management standard enables companies to:
• manage physical security, personnel security (vetting), material control and
accountability, information and transport security;
• facilitate implementation and ensure compliance with current national,
regional and international legal requirements;
• implement, maintain and improve biorisk management;
• ensure conformity with its stated biorisk policy;
• demonstrate such conformity to others; and
• seek internationally recognised third party certification of its biorisk man-
agement system.
More recently CEN developed CWA 16335:2011, a regional agreement on
Biosafety Professional Competence published on 9 September 2011.3 This doc-
ument clearly links biosecurity with the prevention of unauthorised access to
sensitive materials: ‘B.6 Biosecurity: Laboratory biosecurity should be an inte-
gral part of the security plan of an organisation based on risk and threat assess-
1. ISO 9001, available from URL <http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_9000_essentials>; ISO 14001, available
from URL <http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_essentials>; OHSAS 18001, available from URL <http://
www.ohsas-18001-occupational-health-and-safety.com/>. These documents are for purchase only.
2. CWA 15793 is publicly available from <ftp://ftp.cenorm.be/PUBLIC/CWAs/wokrshop31/
CWA15793.pdf>.
3. CWA 16335 available for purchase from <http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/TechnicalCommitteesWork-
shops/Workshops/Pages/WS53-BSP.aspx>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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ment, including physical, personnel and data considerations, to prevent loss,
theft, unauthorised possession, misuse, or diversion of biological material with
dual-use potential.’ It also explicitly refers to the BTWC and UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1540 (2004) as documents that ‘the participant should be able to
demonstrate familiarity, understand and apply’.
Another advantage is that these standards offer guidance to companies in coun-
tries with less fully developed legislation and supervision. They can facilitate
international transactions and investments. Businesses interest in the voluntarily
application of these standards is demonstrated by the present use by life science
institutions of CWA 15793 in 24 countries across the world. However, to
achieve a fully fledged and operational accreditation and certification system
(such as for ISO 9001 and ISO 14001) a global management standard is
required. Global status would enhance the economic viability of an effective
accreditation and certification system, which comprises a set of commercial
activities undertaken in a market context.
From a government perspective and bearing the BTWC objectives in mind, these
developments within the life sciences industry are of interest for several reasons.
They raise awareness within the life sciences community about risks associated
with biological dual-use items. If implemented, the standards increase the
threshold for unauthorised access to agents and technologies and provide an
increased level of assurance that life science institutions act in conformity with
the prohibitions and obligations of the BTWC and the requirements of UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1540. They guarantee responsible biorisk management
in certified facilities, even in countries with inadequate legislation. Finally, they
have the potential to facilitate international transactions that can be relevant for
cooperation, exchanges and technology transfers in the context of Article X of
the BTWC.
Governments and intergovernmental organisations have directly and indirectly
referred to biorisk management standards:
• To promote a culture of responsibility, the US National Strategy for Counter-
ing Biological Threats from 2009 encourages ‘the constituencies of the global
life sciences community to engage in a robust and sustained dialogue as to the
development of behavioral norms and options for their codification’;4
• The EU adopted and implements in cooperation with the WHO a Joint
Action to promote CWA 15793 as an effective tool to implement the WHO
Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance.5
4. National Security Council, ‘US National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats’, November 2009,
URL <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/National_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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• The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Action Plan
from 2009 states that ‘facilities possessing substances on the EU list of high
risk biological agents and toxins [should] consider as appropriate the imple-
mentation of the CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA 15793), WHO Labora-
tory Biosecurity Guidance or their national equivalent standards’.6
• The EU’s Council Decision on the common position for the BTWC’s Seventh
Review Conference states:7
– Art. 3, d (iii) Effective implementation [of the BTWC]…The Union will
encourage discussions on possible options in this regard, … implementa-
tion of appropriate biosafety and biosecurity management standards for
life science institutions.
– Art. 6, c The adoption of appropriate management standards for
biosafety and biosecurity for laboratories and industry, although they are
not in any way a substitute for a compliance regime, can help States Par-
ties in the long term with the implementation of the obligations set out in
the BTWC. They could also prove to be a useful tool, along with other
measures, to contribute to a future enhanced compliance regime. Discus-
sion on this development, i.e., with the relevant industry, could be part of
a new intersessional process.
Increasing the leverage of biorisk management: what can 
the Review Conference do?
There is clearly a growing recognition that industrial management standards can
play a complementary and supportive role in the implementation of Article IV
of the BTWC. At the Review Conference, States Parties could therefore consider
deepening and broadening the dialogue with the life sciences industry to increase
their leverage. There are several occasions to bring industry interests closer to
the disarmament goals. For example, when new standards are drawn up or
5. EU Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 February 2006 in support of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, in the framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Official Journal of the EU, 7 March 2006, pp. L65/51-L65/55, available from URL <http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_065/l_06520060307en00510055.pdf>; World Health
Organisation,  Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance, document WHO/CDS/EPR/2006.6 (2006), available
from URL <http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf>.
6. European Commission, ‘EU CBRN Action Plan’ adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council
meeting on 30 November 2009, available from URL <http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/summary/docs/
com_2009_0273_annexe_2_en.pdf>.
7. Council Decision 2011/429/CFSP of 18 July 2011 relating to the position of the European Union for
the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction (BTWC), Official Journal of the EU, 19 July 2011, pp. L188/42-L188/46, available from
URL <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:188:0042:0046:EN:PDF>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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existing ones reviewed, elements relevant to the BTWC could be inserted. In
addition, adopting such standards would benefit international cooperation and
increase commercial opportunities for life science institutions handling dual-use
biological items that operate in countries whose national BTWC implementa-
tion legislation must still match present international expectations. Eventually
the development of a global biorisk management system/standard could be
undertaken, which would make an effective accreditation and certification sys-
tem economically viable. As a result, more enterprises worldwide would adhere
to the standard and thus contribute to the prevention of biological weapons
while pursuing their business interests.
In this regard the Review Conference could decide to:
• Explicitly recognise that biorisk management standards, created by stake-
holders in the life sciences community, can play a complementary and sup-
portive role in the implementation of the BTWC;
• Call on the life sciences community and international standards organisa-
tions to develop global and certifiable biorisk management standards;
• Encourage states parties to provide assistance, where appropriate, in support
of the implementation of biorisk management standards in life science insti-
tutions in accordance with Article X; and
• Take biorisk management standards and their role for BTWC implementa-
tion up as an intersessional topic and enter into dialogue with representatives
from biosafety associations, the life sciences industry and international
standards organisations on the development of new standards, and review of
existing standards, in order to enhance their leverage towards the implemen-
tation of the BTWC.
States Parties, however, should remain aware that the development and imple-
mentation of standards is a wholly industry-driven and voluntary process. They
should therefore look into ways how they can engage the sector internationally
and nationally to maximise participation, and therefore their impact. Further-
more, adoption and implementation of such standards do not absolve govern-
ments from their own obligations under Article IV of the BTWC and UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1540 to enact, implement and enforce laws and other
legislative measures to prevent any type of actor to engage in the development
and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons.
Needless to say that these standards cannot prevent determined state actors
from acquiring a biological weapon. But they are in fact part of the web of
prevention woven by all stakeholders, and States Parties should look for oppor-
tunities to increase the leverage of biorisk management standards in this regard.39
MULTI-STAKEHOLDERSHIP IN THE BTWC: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
JEAN PASCAL ZANDERS
The contributions in this Egmont Paper illustrate how the life sciences industry
through modest adaptation of existing biorisk management practices and pro-
cedures can contribute to transparency and compliance assurance required to
maintain a robust regime against biological weapons (BW). Systematic involve-
ment of industry representatives, whether through interaction with national
governments or through participation in the multilateral discussions to assess
the operation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and
design and strengthen treaty compliance mechanisms, would add a new
dynamic dimension to current efforts to strengthen the treaty. It would also fit
in the present trends towards multi-stakeholdership in arms control and disar-
mament.
The BTWC started out in a era with an idea of security and an ownership claim
that differ fundamentally from present concepts. At the outset in the early
1970s, states considered BW exclusively in a disarmament framework – the
complete elimination of a discrete weapon category and the prohibition of
future armament with the proscribed weapons. They also viewed themselves as
being the sole custodians of the BTWC. However, compliance verification was
one element of a robust treaty they did not tackle. Almost four decades later, it
still remains an illusive goal.
With the end of the Cold War, the shift away from disarmament towards non-
proliferation and counterproliferation during the 1990s and 2000s reframed the
utility of the BTWC in common and national security. While today everybody
agrees on the need to strengthen the convention, such consensus does not exist
on the points of departure or arrival, and therefore about the possible routes to
explore. Verification of the BTWC is questioned both in terms of its concept and
its contribution to confidence in compliance. The role of non-state actors –
whether as a factor in the evolving BW threat or as a possible contributor to
transparency and compliance assurances – has not yet been fully absorbed into
the BTWC regime. Globalisation has not only pushed the gravity point of
dynamic interaction from states to a variety of transnational actors, it has also
brought to the fore a complex of interlocking problems that seem to defy today’s
resolution capacity of established international institutions or even of more flex-
ible, informal inter-governmental arrangements (such as the G-8 or G-20 con-
figurations). At the same time, national sovereignty in its many incarnationsSETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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throws up many walls against novel governance models, thus effectively pre-
venting speedy resolution of transnational problems. Notwithstanding, below
the surface of political debates, dynamic forces are fast changing the morphol-
ogy of disarmament and arms control, offering opportunities for novel
approaches to resolving old problems and tackling ever-emerging fresh chal-
lenges.
Verification challenged before conception
A prohibition on BW was declared unverifiable before negotiations on the
BTWC had even begun. On 6 August 1968, the United Kingdom submitted a
working paper to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (a precursor to
the current Conference on Disarmament), observing that ‘verification, in the
sense in which the term is normally used in disarmament negotiations, is not
possible in either the chemical or the microbiological field. The difficulty, as far
as the microbiological field is concerned, is that the organisms which would be
used are required for medical and veterinary uses and could be produced
quickly, cheaply and without special facilities either in established laboratories
or in makeshift facilities.’ It argued that the international community should
formulate a new prohibition notwithstanding, because ‘the risks and the fears
of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare will continue and inten-
sify indefinitely’.1 When the Soviet Union and the United States, whose primary
concern was avoidance of any delays in achieving the first Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Treaty, severely diluted some modest British verification proposals in the
negotiation end game, many countries expressed extreme unhappiness, even to
the point of initially refusing to become a state party. Ever since, be it in the First
Committee of the UN General Assembly before the treaty was opened for signa-
ture, the First Review Conference in 1980, or the negotiation by an Ad Hoc
Group of States Parties (AHG) of a legally binding Protocol from 1996 till 2001,
efforts to add formal verification provisions to the BTWC failed. To many, the
unverifiability of a ban on BW has become an article of faith, nobody posing
critical questions anymore.
It is true that between 1975, year of entry into force, and 2001 available verifi-
cation technologies and techniques were hardly adequate to address the specific
challenges posed by BW. Even when in the early 1990s international experts
agreed on a mix of verification methodologies that could enhance confidence in
1. Document ENDC/231, para. 3, reproduced in SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological War-
fare, Volume IV CB Disarmament Negotiations, 1920-1970 (Almqvist & Wiksell: Stockholm, 1971), pp.
255-56.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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treaty compliance, the fast pace of innovation in the life sciences during the
latter half of the decade quickly outdated their proposals. These developments
thus rendered the verification dimension of the draft Protocol obsolete even
before the AHG came close to finalising the negotiations. Among the challenges
the BTWC faced over the years are:
• The multilateralisation of verification activities. When the BTWC was under
negotiation, verification of weapon reductions was not yet an intergovern-
mental activity. The process essentially relied on national technical means –
satellite, radar and aerial observation, as well as signals and human intelli-
gence – and were applied in the context of bilateral US-USSR nuclear arms
control. However, only few states possessed such technologies. Therefore,
their application to global disarmament and arms control agreements then
presupposed the operation of a multilateral verification institution, whose
responsibilities included data collection, assessment and dissemination to all
parties concerned.2 Onsite inspections on the territory of third parties
became feasible with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty, under which US and Soviet weapon inspectors also obtained access
to installations on the territory of the other side’s allies. This multilateral
approach came to full fruition with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC): each party accepts onsite inspections by a team of international
inspectors employed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) set up
the intergovernmental CTBT Organisation (CTBTO) to create and operate a
global detection and monitoring network to deter nuclear detonations.
• Accounting for minute quantities of biological and toxin agents. Most of the
processes agreed in the 1970s and 1980s amounted to ‘verification by sub-
stitution’. Particularly in the realm of nuclear weaponry, the targets of veri-
fication activities were delivery systems, such as missiles and aeroplanes,
rather than the core ingredient, namely fissile materials. Arrangements
included provisions not to obstruct observation of such, by necessity, large
objects. As observation technology and methods improved, the verification
focus shifted to warheads and other weapon components. In the case of BW,
as the British statement aptly observed, the focus of the prohibition had to
be the microbial organism, too small to be observed by existing technologies
and used in too limited quantities in weapon development for accounting
methods conceivable in 1968.
• Response to a breach by an adversary. Arms control is about the manage-
ment of mutually agreed quantitative and qualitative levels of armament.
2. Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, Resolutions and Decisions
adopted by the General Assembly during its Tenth Special Session, 23 May-30 June 1978 (United
Nations: New York, 1978), paras. 31 and 92, pp. 6 and 10.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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After the treaty-specified objectives have been achieved, residual assets
remain deployed with the military forces. Compliance uncertainty was
therefore assessed in terms of a militarily significant risk, in other words, a
breach that might upset the military balance. Verification technologies avail-
able to the USA and the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s could detect the
buildup of large excess capacities and, in view of long lead times for major
weapon development and production, sufficient time was then thought to be
available to respond in kind. US Ambassador Paul Nitze thus defined effec-
tive verification during his 1988 Senate testimony in support of the INF
Treaty: ‘if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any military
significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to
respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the viola-
tion’.3 In contrast, a disarmament treaty wholly eliminates a discrete
weapon category and consequently even a small illegal stockpile may pose a
significant security threat. The quality of compliance uncertainty in a disar-
mament treaty is therefore fundamentally different from that in an arms
control agreement, hence the need for more intrusive verification procedures
and guaranteed security assistance in case of threats or attacks with the pro-
scribed weapons.
Since the 1970s, comfort levels with compliance uncertainty in both arms con-
trol and disarmament treaties have dropped to virtually zero, resulting in
demands of 100 percent verification efficacy. With BW, however, the United
States never expressed any level of confidence as to whether it might be able to
reconstitute an offensive military BW capability within likely warning times.4
Considering that the United States unilaterally abandoned its offensive BW
capacity in 1969 based (in part) on the argument that it offered only limited
additional deterrence benefits over the nuclear arsenal, current doubts about the
efficacy of verification of nuclear arms reductions and reliability of the current
arsenal, as expressed during, for example, the ratification debates of the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, are unlikely to favour a BW verification
regime in the near future.5 The inclusion of non-state actors, such as terrorists,
3. Cited in Ola Dahlman, ‘Verification: to detect, to deter and to build confidence’, Disarmament Forum,
no. 3 (2010), p. 3.
4. Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive
Biological Weapons Program, Case Study Series, no. 1, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, National Defense University, Washington, DC, October 2009, pp. 7 and 8.
5. Tucker and Mahan (Ibidem) note that the US never revisited the unilateral renunciation of biological
and toxin weapons even though it became increasingly suspicious of Soviet continuation of its offensive
BW program, primarily because concerns about Soviet cheating were regarded as irrelevant to the larger
strategic rationale behind the U.S. unilateral renunciation. However, it should be added that by the time
the US leveled its most serious accusations against the Soviet Union, it was bound by the BTWC prohibi-
tions under any circumstances, thus including violations by a potential adversary.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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possessing or seeking to acquire biological materials, in the threat circumscrip-
tion also bodes ill for the traditional organisation of disarmament and arms
control approaches to ensure compliance.
New pathways to confidence in compliance
While the sources of the threat and threat perceptions have changed in signifi-
cant ways, over the past 43 years the actors, tools and processes for enhancing
transparency, ascertain compliance and organising verification too have multi-
plied and gained in both sophistication and efficacy. They include:
• The acceptance of the principle of off-site and on-site inspections, as well as
the availability of inspection tools, procedures and expertise from other arms
control and disarmament regimes. The 1986 Stockholm Agreement first
introduced onsite inspections by one party on the territory of another party
as a compliance and verification tool.6 Under the INF Treaty, agreed the next
year, this became a continuous activity. The CWC extended these type of
inspections to civilian facilities that have the potential to develop and manu-
facture CW, but were not necessarily involved in past government-run CW
programmes. From the late 1980s onwards, the chemical industry became
heavily involved in the drafting of verification procedures that meet the goals
of the CWC and safeguard industry interests.
• The expansion of state surveillance capacity. Since the 9/11 terrorist strikes,
many aspects of public life are now routinely monitored, increasing, among
other things, the ability to track or trace domestic and international move-
ments of individuals. Such scooping, for instance at airports, border controls
or simple road traffic or site monitoring, takes place irrespective of whether
people are suspected of malfeasance. Data traffic, including among other
things telephone calls, faxes, e-mail, can be monitored on a permanent basis.
Specific trigger words may initiate in-depth investigations of particular com-
munications with a view of preempting, for instance, criminal or terrorist
activities.7 Similarly, forensics increasingly have the ability to determine the
nature of activities and the provenance of certain substances, as well as to
6. Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of
the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 19 September 1986,
para. 65, available from URL <http://www.osce.org/fsc/41238>.
7. Gerhard Schmid, Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and com-
mercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI)), European Parliament: Tem-
porary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System, document A5-0264/2001 (Final), 11 July
2001, available from URL <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NON-
SGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN>.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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place people at a particular location at a specific time. Overall surveillance
capacity is furthermore vastly increased by complex search functions ena-
bling access to interlinked databases.
• The application of information and communication technologies to manage
the ever growing generation of digital data. Economic actors increasingly
computerise their activities, while government agencies maintain digital
databases ever growing in size and sophistication holding information on
private practices in certain sectors of activities.8
• Newly accepted practices of social control, including the adoption of stand-
ards, best practices, codes of conduct and behaviour, as well as the appoint-
ment of ombudsmen or the acceptance of the role of whistle blowers.
• Strengthened oversight and monitoring of industry practices and research
activities, which include public health as well as safety and security stand-
ards, government licensing of certain activities, applications under export
control regulations and end user certification, data collection under the
BTWC confidence-building measures, etc.
• International expectation of transparency regarding state behaviour based
on a growing appreciation that the governance of a treaty such as the BTWC
is a shared responsibility. The increasing levels of information exchanges
make that the past practice of state secrecy is now taken as an indicator of
malevolent intent.
• The mobilisation of social networks to discover, detect or monitor certain
events and developments. Presently social media already play a central role
in transnational disarmament and arms control campaigns.9 One experiment
demonstrated the possibility of inducing people to find a finite number arte-
facts in a large geographical space in a short time frame through remote
coordination.10 Experiments stimulate the development of both technologies
and strategies for public participation in remote verification and monitor-
ing.11 Tracking and cross-analysing postings on internet-based social net-
working tools enables the detection of patterns that can point with a reason-
able degree of confidence to certain types of behaviour that might be relevant
8. Keith Krause, ‘Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Govern mentality’, Con-
temporary Security Policy, vol. 32, no. 1 (2011), p. 24.
9. See, for example, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons at URL <http://www.icanw.org/
> and Global Zero at URL <http://www.globalzero.org/>.
10. For a general description of the 2009 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Network
Challenge, see the Wikipedia entry at URL <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DARPA_Network_Challenge>.
For more detail on the mobilisation strategy by the winning team, see ‘Media Lab team wins DARPA’s
Red Balloon Challenge’, press release, MIT Media Relations, 10 December 2009, URL <http://
web.mit.edu/press/2009/darpa-challenge-1210.html>.
11. For instance, Public Laboratory for Open Technology and Science (PLOTS), at URL <http://publiclab-
oratory.org/home>. PLOTS contributed to the environmental monitoring after the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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to prevent BW.12 Their potential as a future tool for monitoring and verifi-
cation has been recognised, although further investigation is still required to
determine that such activities cannot be spoofed or manipulated.13
Who owns the BTWC?
A decade ago inquiring about the ownership of the BTWC would have elicited
puzzled questions about the purpose of the query. States had the treaty firmly in
their hands and so-called ‘friends of the treaty’ – mostly representatives from
various civil society constituencies – offered critical, yet mostly constructive
insight and advice at their own discretion or held States Parties to account if they
did not deliver promised ameliorations.14 Today, the answer is less straightfor-
ward and people would interpret the question about ownership in terms of gov-
ernance, and ultimately of future direction of treaty development. The BTWC is
not alone in facing the issue. An in-depth reflection on the future of the OPCW
notes that the CWC implementation organisation ‘is the collective property and
responsibility of the States Parties but at the same time has become a global
public good’.15 Subtly, the report does not claim that ownership of the CWC
resides solely with the States Parties. The distinction is important: after comple-
tion of chemical weapon destruction, the CWC will face challenges not unlike
those confronting the BTWC today.
Overlapping networks of cooperation and integration of activities appear to
point to the future of BW disarmament. The two intersessional series of activi-
ties (2003-2005 and 2007-2010) brought in representatives from organisations
as diverse as the World health Organisation, Food and Agricultural Organisa-
tion and the World Organisation for Animal Health, Interpol, the World Trade
Organisation and the World Customs Organisation, United Nations agencies
concerned with disarmament, environmental protection and development,
treaty-specific disarmament organisations, multi- and transnational companies,
research institutes, etc., into the debates on strengthening the BTWC. The meet-
12. See, for example, Laila Shereen Sakr’s study of traffic patterns from Twitter and Facebook to deter-
mine the directions of the uprisings in the Middle East during the spring of 2011. Jon Friedman, ‘Twitter’s
window on Middle East uprisings’, Market Watch, 18 May 2011, URL <http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/twitters-window-on-middle-east-uprisings-2011-05-18>.
13. Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, ‘From
the Manhattan Project to the Cloud: Arms Control in the Information Age’, Sidney Drell Lecture at Stan-
ford University, Stanford, CA, 27 October 2011, URL <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/176331.htm>.
14. Nicholas A. Sims, ‘The BTWC in Historical Perspective: From Review and Strengthening Processes to
an Integrated Treaty Regime’, Disarmament Forum, no. 4 (2000), p. 19.
15. Note by the Director General, Report of the Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Technical Secretariat, document S/951/2011, 25 July 2011, p.
3, para. 2. (Italics in original.)SETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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ings also expanded the number of participating non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and contributed to the professionalisation and specialisation of their
input. The range of actors who can apply for disarmament purposes the tools
and processes described in the previous section has also widened from state
agencies to international organisations, civil society constituencies, professional
and scientific associations, and even individuals.
Equally important is that today the concept of transparency requires solidifica-
tion, particularly if its ultimate goal is the generation of data that offer context
to interpret activities and judge treaty compliance in the absence of formal ver-
ification. In its most traditional sense it pertains to governments and concerns
the opportunities they have to establish compliance with the BTWC by another
state party. However, they have more tools at their disposal to ascertain compli-
ance among allied and friendly states and will adopt a more congenial approach
to activities whose potential ambiguity might raise concern if undertaken by a
more antagonistic party. To avert this type of interpretation bias, states may also
be willing to generate transparency proactively in order to demonstrate compli-
ance to other state parties. This requires a degree of openness that can remove
ambiguity. While today, as noted earlier, states share information with each
other on levels that would have constituted high treason only a few decades ago,
it remains true that even the most open democracies are unable to share all.
More importantly, however, depending on a polity’s conception of ‘national sov-
ereignty’, the willingness to share certain information about domestic activities
in the field of the life sciences, biotechnology or BW defence with all BTWC
parties may vary considerably. Therefore, as some states move forward with
proactive openness, the risk that reluctance to voluntary share such information
be interpreted as an indicator of non-compliance may rise in the near future.
Stakeholder communities, whether as part of data exchanges among members
of transnational epistemic communities or for business and trades reasons, can
contribute to the generation of necessary transparency and offer context on how
to interpret information, which otherwise would remain ambiguous.
A final question concerns who should share in the results of such transparency
activities, particularly since stakeholders other than states contribute to the gen-
eration of transparency, whether as part of formalised procedures enabling the
public access to government documents or as an outcome of the widening role
of civil society and professional organisations in BTWC implementation. Hav-
ing access to certain data from transparency activities would not only improve
civil society monitoring and analysis, but also contribute to the development of
future BTWC governance models, while a better sense of expectations from the
disarmament community can help the biotechnology and pharmaceutical indus-
tries to ameliorate confidence in the legitimacy of their international businessSETTING A STANDARD FOR STAKEHOLDERSHIP
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partners and in turn feed into the generation of transparency. For the foreseeable
future, again a major discrepancy between those societies that actively invite
civil society and other constituencies into the disarmament debate and imple-
mentation and those that advocate the primacy of the state as the sole stake-
holder in a treaty such as the BTWC will continue to exist, if not grow. The
principle of the matter must be resolved to reach a shared understanding of
transparency and reach beyond that concept to devise verification.
These evolutions illustrate the growing appreciation that the prevention of BW
lies not just with a single treaty, but has become a shared responsibility of all.
However, the many institutions and agencies still need to expand their respective
comfort zones for working together, sharing information and integrating activ-
ities where possible. Bureaucratic resistance, different membership, or the stakes
of different state agencies in the functioning of the various international organ-
isations may remain major impediments. The same applies to interactions
among the scientific and professional communities, industry, civil society con-
stituencies, as well as with their interactions with governments and intergovern-
mental organisations. There is still a long and arduous road ahead, yet, interest-
ingly enough, its very weaknesses are transforming the BTWC into a laboratory
for the future governance of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation
based on multi-stakeholdership and functional specialisation between govern-
ments and other stakeholders.